Another element of this strategy involved circumventing UN sanctions and the OFF program by means of “Protocols” or government-to-government economic trade agreements.
Protocols allowed Saddam to generate a large amount of revenue outside the purview of the UN.
But it is not in ISG’s mandate or capabilities to investigate or judge those non-Iraqi individuals or entities.
And in many cases, the Iraqi documents and detainees stop short of confirming that a particular transaction was consummated, or that a courted foreign government official said “yes” to Iraqi blandishments.
Translations of Iraq’s Bilateral Trade Protocols B. Suspected Intermediary and Front Companies Associated With Iraq L.
UN Security Council Resolutions Applicable to Iraq I.
Saddam severely under estimated the economic and military costs of invading Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990, as well as underestimating the subsequent international condemnation of his invasion of Kuwait.
He did not anticipate this condemnation, nor the subsequent imposition, comprehensiveness, severity, and longevity of UN sanctions.
For a cut of the profits, these trade intermediaries moved, and in many cases smuggled, the prohibited items through land, sea, and air entry points along the Iraqi border.[Top of page] Throughout the 1990s and up to OIF (March 2003), Saddam focused on one set of objectives: the survival of himself, his Regime, and his legacy.